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NOTE
U.S. TERM LIMITS, INC. V. THORNTON: WHO ARE THE
PEOPLE AND WHY DOES IT MATTER?
Benjamin S. Walton†
ABSTRACT
The issue of who formed the Constitution—the people of the United
States acting as one people group or as many distinct people groups—is an
issue that directly affects the rights of the American people and the manner
in which the people may define, exercise, and circumscribe their rights. In
U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, several Justices on the United States
Supreme Court debated whether the people acted as one people group or as
multiple people groups when they formed the constitutional Union. Justice
Stevens, who wrote for the majority, did not give a detailed analysis of this
issue. Thus, the issue remains fairly open, and when it reappears before the
Court, the Court needs to address it forthrightly, explicitly, thoroughly, and
correctly.
The stakes in this debate are high. If the people of America acted as one
people group to form the Constitution, then they reserved to themselves as
one body all the rights not delegated to the Federal Government or to the
state governments. Under this view, the people of Virginia as a corporate
body have no rights; only the people of America as a whole possess rights,
and only this national people group can stipulate how those rights will be
exercised. If rights may be exercised only by the people of the nation as a
whole, a simple majority of the nation’s populace controls the exercise of
reserved rights under the Tenth Amendment for all Americans. However, if
the people of each state may determine how they wish to exercise their
reserved rights for themselves, this can potentially accommodate the views
and desires of more people and allow cultural diversity to prevail over
cultural uniformity and conformity. The manner in which this issue is
resolved will determine whether America is diverse or uniform respecting
the exercise of popular rights.
The historical evidence surrounding the ratification of the Constitution
strongly supports the proposition that the separate people groups of the
† Editor-in-Chief, Liberty University Law Review, Volume 4; J.D. Candidate, Liberty
University School of Law, May 2010; B.A., Whitefield College, 2007. I would like to
dedicate this Note to my parents, to whom I most assuredly owe the credit for anything I
achieve in life.
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individual states formed the Constitution. The political status of the people
of the United States before the Constitution was that of thirteen independent
and sovereign peoples, not of one politically unified mass of people. Thus,
when the people acted to form the constitutional Union, they were acting as
numerous separate people groups. Furthermore, the fact that each state
ratified the Constitution for itself shows that the people of each state acted
independently of the people of other states in deciding whether the people
of each state would be subject to the Constitution. A simple majority of the
American populace as a whole did not make this decision on behalf of the
entire nation. Also, the official state ratifications of the Constitution
demonstrate that the people of each state acted self-consciously as such to
ratify the Constitution for each state individually. Finally, James Madison
and Thomas Jefferson supported the idea of separate states with their own
politically distinct people groups.
The evidence is available, and the Supreme Court should recognize it.
Sovereignty resides in the people—not in the people of the nation as a
whole, but in the separate peoples of the individual states.
I. INTRODUCTION
Exactly who are “the people” of the United States? This is a broad
question, but this Note will examine the political definition of “the people”
as that phrase is used in the Tenth Amendment.1 In U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v.
Thornton,2 the United States Supreme Court was divided over the structural
identity of the people who formed the Constitution. Justice Stevens, writing
for the majority, seemed to embrace the idea that the people of America
formed the Constitution as one people group.3 Justice Kennedy wrote a
concurring opinion in which he explicitly argued that one national people
group formed the Constitution.4 In a dissenting opinion, Justice Thomas
argued that the peoples of the several states, as separate people groups,
formed the Constitution.5 This Note will examine whether the people of the
United States formed the Constitution as one people group or as thirteen
separate people groups.

1. The Tenth Amendment provides: “The powers not delegated to the United States by
the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or
to the people.” U.S. CONST. amend. X.
2. U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779 (1995).
3. See infra Part III.A.
4. See infra Part III.B.
5. See infra Part III.C.
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Why does this debate matter? The way in which one identifies the
structure of “the people” who formed the Constitution has deeply
significant ramifications for the manner in which American citizens define
and exercise their rights. As Justice Henry Baldwin noted in 1837, the
importance of this issue becomes manifest when one considers “whether a
state restricts itself, or is restricted by an external power; whether the
reservations are to the people collectively, or the people of each state.”6
Reasoning from the idea that reservations in a grant are valid only if made
by and for the grantor, Baldwin concluded that one of two propositions
must be true: either “the people of the several states, have now no reserved
powers, or . . . they are the granting power of the constitution . . . .”7 In
other words, if the people of America as one national people group formed
the Constitution and delegated powers to the Federal Government, then the
peoples of the several states, as such, have no rights at all reserved to them
under the Tenth Amendment. Conversely, if the peoples of the states
formed the Constitution as separate people groups, then the people of each
state possess the rights reserved to “the people” under the Tenth
Amendment.8
The implications of this distinction are significant.9 If the rights of the
people can be exercised only by the people of America acting as one people
6. HENRY BALDWIN, A GENERAL VIEW OF THE ORIGIN AND NATURE OF THE
CONSTITUTION AND GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES, DEDUCED FROM THE POLITICAL
HISTORY AND CONDITION OF THE COLONIES AND STATES, FROM 1774 UNTIL 1788, at 64
(photo. reprint 2000) (Philadelphia, John C. Clark 1837).
7. Id. at 65; see also id. at 64. Baldwin recognized that if the peoples of the several
states were the grantors of powers to the Federal Government, they, “as grantors, could
make exceptions to the powers of congress, to their own reserved powers, and reserve what
was not so granted or excepted.” Id. at 65. Thus, under this view, the people of each state
hold for themselves the powers reserved to them under the Tenth Amendment; such powers
are not held by the people of the nation as a whole.
8. See U.S. CONST. amend. X.
9. At least one scholar has denigrated the significance of this issue:
What useful purpose would be served by embracing the dissent’s claim that the
“ultimate source of the Constitution’s authority is the consent of the people of
each individual State, not the consent of the undifferentiated people of the
Nation as a whole”? It is surprising that, in the mid-1990s, four Justices of the
nation’s highest court were willing to subscribe to such extremes of misguided
provincialism, oblivious to the consequences that embodiment of these
principles would entail.
Stanley H. Friedelbaum, Term Limits, The State Courts, and National Dominion: The
Vicissitudes of American Federalism, 60 ALB. L. REV. 1567, 1580 (1997) (quoting U.S.
Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 846 (1995) (Thomas, J., dissenting)).
Notwithstanding Professor Friedelbaum’s assertions, the Introduction to this Note seeks to
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group, then forty-nine percent of the entire American population will never
be able to exercise these rights in any way other than that prescribed or
allowed by the majority of the national populace. However, if the separate
people groups of the several states individually hold the rights reserved to
the people under the Tenth Amendment, the people of Virginia can choose
to exercise their rights in one way, the people of Texas in another, and the
people of California in yet another. For example, the general right to
privacy encompasses many specific rights (perhaps we could call them
“sub-rights”), and different people disagree over the precise manner in
which these more specific sub-rights are to be defined, exercised, and
limited. The people of one state may wish to recognize an unlimited right to
informed consent, while the people of another state may want to
circumscribe this right in certain ways. The people of one state may wish to
recognize an unqualified right to bodily integrity, while the people of
another state may place various restrictions on this right vis-à-vis various
state interests the people may deem sufficiently compelling to warrant such
restrictions. Does the power to make these types of decisions reside with
the people of each individual state, or with a simple majority of the
American populace?
If the people of America as a whole possess the power to define and limit
their reserved rights under the Tenth Amendment, there will be no diversity
among the states, but rather a rigid uniformity that will stifle political
experimentation and that may even hamper cultural development. If,
however, the people of each state may decide for themselves the precise
contours and boundaries of their own popular rights, the rights of the people
will not be determined according to a one-size-fits-all approach. Rather,
American society will be diversified in the manner in which many different
people groups choose to define, exercise, and restrict their rights. When it
comes to exercising popular rights, do we want diversity or uniformity
throughout our vast country with its many millions of inhabitants? This is
the issue. The debate over whether one people group or several people
groups formed the Constitution will decide the manner in which Americans
may exercise their rights.10
raise some considerations indicating that this very issue is highly important, not only
theoretically, but also practically in the consequences it logically entails.
10. Assuming arguendo that the American people as one single group possess the
power to define and circumscribe the rights reserved to the people under the Tenth
Amendment, we must ask how the American people as one large group would be able to
prescribe the manner in which a particular right would be exercised. The only way for the
people of America, considered as one large people group, to enact legislation determining
the manner in which particular rights will be exercised is for their representatives in the
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This Note proposes and will seek to demonstrate through historical
evidence that the separate people groups of the individual states, not the
people of the nation as a whole, formed the Constitution. The sovereignty
that resides in the people does not reside in the people of America as a
single group, but in the people of each state as a separate entity. Part II of
this Note describes the views of this issue taken by the Supreme Court, the
Senate, and various constitutional scholars in the nineteenth century. Part
III examines the views of this issue taken by each of the Justices who
authored an opinion in U.S. Term Limits. Part IV then investigates historical
evidence relevant to a resolution of this issue. The political status of the
people of the United States before they ratified the Constitution, the official
ratifications of the Constitution by the original thirteen states, and the views
of such notable Founders as James Madison and Thomas Jefferson all
indicate that the separate people groups of the several states formed the
Constitution and therefore possess the rights reserved to “the people” under
the Tenth Amendment.
II. BACKGROUND
Since the earliest days of the Union, judges, legislators, and
constitutional scholars have discussed and debated whether one people
group or thirteen people groups formed the Constitution. There is no clear
consensus either in the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence or in the early
scholarly commentary on the Constitution as to whether the people of
America as a whole or the distinct people groups of the several states
formed the Constitution.

Federal Congress to act. Cf. infra text accompanying notes 91-92. However, if Congress has
no jurisdiction over those matters reserved to the people under the Tenth Amendment, the
people are left with only one means of determining how they will or will not exercise their
rights: constitutional amendment. If the Constitution is amended to allow the Federal
Government to pass laws defining or circumscribing a permissible scope of action for its
citizens, then the people of America can accomplish their objective of prescribing how
certain rights will and will not be exercised in their society. However, the process of
amending the Constitution is extremely difficult and unlikely to occur very often. More
importantly, a constitutional amendment delegating additional power to the Federal
Government means that the people no longer possess that newly delegated power. This
means that in order to exercise their reserved rights, the people of America have to give up
the power over that right to the Federal Government. This result seems to contradict the very
spirit of the Tenth Amendment. Proponents of the idea that the people of America formed
the Constitution as a single people group should consider carefully the full implications of
their position.
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A. The Supreme Court
Chief Justice John Marshall appears to have embraced the idea that the
people of America, acting as one unified whole, formed the Constitution. It
is unclear, however, whether the Court after Marshall has agreed with his
view.
1. The Marshall Court
In 1819, Chief Justice Marshall authored two opinions for the Court that
addressed in part the subject of who the parties to the Constitution were.
According to Marshall, the Constitution was formed by one American
people. In Sturges v. Crowninshield,11 Marshall stated that the Federal
Government was created by “the American people.”12 Although this phrase
by itself does not conclusively indicate whether Marshall was referring to
one people mass or to many separate people groups, he proceeded to clarify
his intended meaning. Speaking of the powers reserved to the states,
Marshall wrote that “[t]hese powers proceed, not from the people of
America, but from the people of the several states . . . .”13 In other words,
Marshall maintained that the powers of the individual state governments
proceed from the different people groups of the several states, but that the
powers of the Federal Government proceed from the people of America as a
whole.
In McCulloch v. Maryland,14 decided a mere two-and-a-half weeks after
Sturges,15 Marshall explicitly rejected the proposition advanced by
Maryland that the Constitution was formed by “the act of sovereign and
independent states,” instead of by the people themselves.16 Maryland
contended that the powers of the Federal Government proceeded from the
states.17 Marshall, however, pointed out that the state legislatures merely
elected the members of the Constitutional Convention, whereas the people
were the ones who actually ratified the Constitution.18 The states submitted
the Constitution to the people, so that the people themselves could decide
whether to adopt the Constitution.19 Once ratified by the people, the
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.

Sturges v. Crowninshield, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 122 (1819).
Id. at 193.
Id.
McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
Sturges was decided on February 17, 1819, and McCulloch on March 7, 1819.
McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 402-03.
Id. at 402.
Id. at 403-05.
Id. at 403-04.
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Constitution “bound the state sovereignties,” who could not override the
decision of the people.20
Marshall’s point in McCulloch is not exactly the same point he appears
to have made in Sturges. In McCulloch, Marshall specifically refuted the
idea that the state governments were the parties to the Constitution.
Marshall insisted that the people were the proper parties to the Constitution.
It is unclear simply from the language in McCulloch whether Marshall
would have opposed the proposition that the peoples of the several states
acting as separate groups, rather than the people of America acting as a
whole, formed the Constitution. However, it is indeed possible to interpret
Marshall’s references in McCulloch to “the people” as conveying the sense
of one single entity.21 This interpretation of Marshall’s language in
McCulloch is supported by his opinion in Sturges, where he clearly
contrasted “the people of America” with “the people of the several states,”
and asserted that it was “the American people” who created the Federal
Government.22 According to Marshall, therefore, the people of America
formed the Constitution as one entity.23

20. Id. at 404.
21. Id. at 402-05.
22. Sturges v. Crowninshield, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 122, 193 (1819).
23. Some of Chief Justice Marshall’s language in McCulloch is problematic for his
apparent view that the people of America as a whole formed the Constitution. Marshall
states that “the people had already surrendered all their powers to the state sovereignties, and
had nothing more to give. But, surely, the question whether they may resume and modify the
powers granted to government, does not remain to be settled in this country.” McCulloch, 17
U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 404. If the people had to resume certain powers from each of the original
thirteen state governments in order to transfer those particular powers to the Federal
Government in the Constitution, this implies the Constitution was formed by the people
groups of the several states, rather than by one national people group. The people of New
York, the people of Georgia, or the united “people of America” as a whole cannot revoke the
powers of the Delaware state government and re-grant those powers to the Federal
Government. Only the people of Delaware themselves, who originally “surrendered all their
powers” to the Delaware state government, can rightfully revoke those powers and re-grant
them to the Federal Government. Marshall’s language here necessarily implies that the
Constitution was formed by the people groups of the several states, yet he does not seem to
realize the latent inconsistency between his clear language in Sturges and this particular
statement in McCulloch. Since the interpretational conflict is between a fairly clear assertion
in Sturges and an implicit conclusion from certain language in McCulloch, it seems fair to
say that Marshall’s view was indeed that the people of America acted as one people group to
form the Constitution. This is therefore the view this author is attributing to Marshall.
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2. The Court After Marshall
After the Marshall era, the Court only rarely and sporadically
commented on the nature of the Union. The few times the Court did discuss
the nature of the Union, it did not clearly adopt the position Justice
Marshall had expressed in 1819. In his dissenting opinion in the Passenger
Cases in 1849,24 Chief Justice Roger Taney observed that “[f]or all the
great purposes for which the Federal Government was formed, we are one
people, with one common country.”25 Reading this statement in isolation,
one might conclude that Taney viewed the Constitution as having been
formed by one people group. However, this interpretation of Taney’s
statement is not the only reasonable one. Taney made this assertion in the
context of his contention that United States citizens have the right freely to
travel in and to engage in commerce with every part of the Union.26 As
Taney observed, the Constitution was formed “to secure the freest
intercourse between the citizens of the different States.”27 For the purpose
of achieving free intercourse and each of the other “great purposes for
which the Federal Government was formed,” Taney asserted that the
American people are “one people.”28 This means that now that the
Constitution has been formed, United States citizens are treated as one
people group for certain purposes. However, it is not clear whether Taney
intended his reference to “one people” to mean that the Constitution itself
was actually formed by one people, or even whether United States citizens
are “one people” for all purposes, instead of merely for those specific
purposes for which the Constitution was formed. It is unclear whether
Taney would have said that the people of the United States are one people
or several peoples in the specific context of exercising the rights reserved to
the people under the Tenth Amendment.29
24. Passenger Cases, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 283 (1849) (Taney, C.J., dissenting). Although
Chief Justice Taney’s opinion in the Passenger Cases was a dissenting opinion rather than a
majority opinion, the Court later observed that the statements in Taney’s opinion discussed
here were consistent with the Court’s jurisprudence in general. Crandall v. Nevada, 73 U.S.
(6 Wall.) 35, 49 (1867). The Court quoted approvingly from this portion of Taney’s opinion
in Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 629-30 (1969). Thus, the Court has explicitly
recognized the validity of the portion of Taney’s dissent discussed here.
25. Passenger Cases, 48 U.S. (7 How.) at 492.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. If the American people are one people only for those purposes for which the
Constitution was formed, this would seem to imply that they are not one people for purposes
of the Tenth Amendment. This is because the purposes for which the Constitution was
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In the 1920 case of Hawke v. Smith,30 the Court stated that “the people”
ordained the Constitution, and that “[t]he states surrendered to the general
government the powers specifically conferred upon the nation . . . .”31 One
might interpret “the people” here to mean one people group, but the Court’s
reference to the states surrendering powers to the Federal Government
seems to imply that the states were parties to the Constitution.
Unfortunately, the Court did not specify the precise manner in which states
are parties to the Constitution. Did the states surrender certain powers
because the state governments agreed to do so, or because the people of the
states determined their state governments must do so? Later in its opinion,
the Court noted that “the state and its people . . . alike assented” to the
Constitution.32 Again, the Court did not explain its precise meaning. Did the
states and the people assent to the Constitution in the same way? Were the
states parties to the Constitution just as the people were? Or, were the
people the ones who formed the Constitution, while the states merely gave
a type of assent that was not conclusive as far as the formal validity of the
Constitution was concerned? Marshall would have agreed that the states
“assented” to the Constitution, but he did not view the states as actually
being parties to the Constitution. It is not clear whether the Court in Hawke
intended to contradict Marshall’s view that the states were not themselves
parties to the Constitution. It is plausible, however, to read the Court’s
language in Hawke to imply that both the states and the people were parties
to the Constitution.
Regardless of whether Hawke is interpreted to assert that the state
governments themselves were parties to the Constitution, it does seem as
though the Court viewed the people who formed the Constitution as being
the peoples of the several states, rather than one unified people group. This
may be inferred from the Court’s affirmation that it was “the state and its
people” that assented to the Constitution.33 Interestingly, the Court did not
formed involve the powers delegated to the Federal government in the Constitution, but do
not involve the powers reserved to the people or the states. If the people reserve certain
powers to themselves that they do not deem necessary or prudent to delegate to the Federal
government, this implies that these reserved powers are not necessary to the fulfillment of
the specific purposes for which the people are forming a Federal government. Thus, the
Tenth Amendment does not implicate the specific purposes for which the Constitution was
formed. This means that if the people of the United States are one people only for those
purposes for which the Constitution was formed, they are not one people for purposes of the
Tenth Amendment and the exercise of reserved powers.
30. Hawke v. Smith, 253 U.S. 221 (1920).
31. Id. at 226.
32. Id. at 230.
33. Id. (emphasis added).
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say that the states and the people of America assented to the Constitution.
Rather, the Court spoke of a particular state and the people of that state as
being the ones who assented to the Constitution. It is not entirely clear
whether this necessarily implies the Court in Hawke viewed the peoples of
the several states as the parties to the Constitution, but this is certainly a
reasonable interpretation of the Court’s language in Hawke.
B. The Senate Resolutions of 1838 and 1860
The issue of whether the people of America as a whole or the peoples of
the several states formed the Constitution has not been definitively settled
in the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence. However, the Senate did address this
issue in 1838 and again in 1860. According to the nineteenth-century
Senate, it was the peoples of the several states who formed the Constitution.
In a series of resolutions in 1838, the United States Senate clearly set
forth its own view of who the parties to the Constitution were. The first of
these resolutions declared that the states were the ones who had adopted the
Constitution, “and that each [state], for itself, by its own voluntary assent,
entered the Union . . . .”34 According to the second resolution, the states
were the ones who delegated “a portion of their powers to be exercised by
the Federal Government . . . .”35 If this were not clear enough, the third
resolution forthrightly affirmed that “[the Federal] Government was
instituted and adopted by the several States of this Union as a common
agent, in order to carry into effect the powers which they had delegated by
the Constitution for their mutual security and prosperity . . . .”36 In other
words, the states were the ones who delegated powers to the Federal
Government in the Constitution. Again, the fourth resolution declared that
the states gave a “pledge to protect and defend each other, . . . on entering
into the constitutional compact which formed the Union . . . .”37 According
to the Senate in 1838, therefore, the states themselves were parties to the
Constitution.
Was the Senate contradicting the idea Marshall had articulated nineteen
years earlier in McCulloch, that the people and not the state governments
were the parties who had formed the Constitution? It is certainly not
necessary to interpret these resolutions as opposing the idea that the people
themselves formed the Constitution. Rather, when the Senate referred to
“states,” it is entirely plausible to interpret such a reference as connoting the
34.
35.
36.
37.

S. Res. 1, 25th Cong., 6 CONG. GLOBE 98 (1838).
S. Res. 2, 25th Cong., 6 CONG. GLOBE 98 (1838).
S. Res. 3, 25th Cong., 6 CONG. GLOBE 98 (1838).
S. Res. 4, 25th Cong., 6 CONG. GLOBE 98 (1838).
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peoples of the several states, rather than the governments of the several
states. The thrust of these Senate Resolutions appears to be that the Union
does not consist of one people mass ruled by one government, but that the
Constitution was formed by separate entities, i.e., by states acting as distinct
societal groups.
The Senate Resolutions of 1838 were not an unrepeated aberration in
nineteenth-century legislative activity. In 1860, the Senate again passed a
set of resolutions, the first of which affirmed that the states adopted the
Constitution, “[acting] severally as free and independent sovereignties,” and
“delegating a portion of their powers to be exercised by the Federal
Government.”38 The Second Resolution explicitly said that the states
entered “into the constitutional compact which formed the Union” and gave
mutual pledges and incurred “solemn obligations” to one other.39 The Third
Resolution referred to “the union of these States,” rather than speaking of a
union of “people.”40
Thus, the Senate in 1838 and again in 1860 expressly affirmed the idea
that the states formed the Constitution and are members of the Union.
According to the Senate in the nineteenth century, the states delegated to
the Federal Government the powers it possesses. While it is not clear
whether the Senate meant that the states as people groups or the states as
established governments formed the Constitution, it is certainly reasonable
to interpret the Senate’s pronunciations to mean that the states, acting as
distinct sovereign societal groups, formed the Federal Government. This
interpretation of the Senate Resolutions of 1838 and 1860 is consistent with
the other historical evidence presented in this Note.
C. Nineteenth-Century Constitutional Scholars
The Supreme Court and the United States Senate are not the only sources
of opinions on and disagreements over the nature of the Union. Several
noted constitutional scholars of the nineteenth century expressed different
opinions on who formed the Constitution. Unfortunately, there was no
absolute consensus on this issue, although several scholars appear to have
supported the view that the people groups of the several states formed the
Constitution.

38. S. Res. 1, 36th Cong., 29 CONG. GLOBE 2321 (1860).
39. S. Res. 2, 36th Cong., 29 CONG. GLOBE 2321 (1860).
40. S. Res. 3, 36th Cong., 29 CONG. GLOBE 2321 (1860).
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1. William Rawle
In 1825, William Rawle explained his view that with the adoption of the
Constitution, “[t]he people of the states unite[d] with each other, without
destroying their previous organization.”41 Rawle appears to have been
saying that the people of each state united with the peoples of each of the
other original thirteen states to form the Union, without destroying the
organization of the state people groups as distinct societies. Rawle also
stated that the Federal Government “is a society formed not only out of the
people of other societies, but in certain parts, formed by the societies
themselves.”42 Rawle asserted that both the states and the people are
“member[s] of the Union.”43 Regardless of whether one agrees with
Rawle’s view that the state governments themselves participated in forming
the Federal Government, it is significant to note that Rawle viewed the
people who formed the Constitution as consisting of people of separate
societies who came together “without destroying their previous
organization” as distinct societal entities.44 According to Rawle, therefore,
the peoples of the several states united to form a Federal Government, and
they did not thereby obliterate the fact that they were distinct societies.
Perhaps the most revealing statement from Rawle is his reference to the
fact that it was the people of each particular state who transferred to the
Federal Government the powers it possesses. Rawle’s exact language is:
“[E]very state must be viewed as entirely sovereign in all points not
transferred by the people who compose it to the government of the Union . .
. .”45 Significantly, Rawle did not say that the people of America transferred
powers to the Federal Government. Rather, he indicated that the people
who compose each particular state acted as a state to transfer powers to the
Federal Government. Rawle thus seems to have embraced the view that the
peoples of each state acted as distinct bodies in forming the Constitution.
2. Joseph Story
In his Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States,46 Justice
Joseph Story clearly rejected the idea that the state governments formed the
41. WILLIAM RAWLE, A VIEW OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
40 (Walter D. Kennedy & James R. Kennedy eds., Land & Land Publishing Division 1993)
(1825).
42. Id. at 41.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 40.
45. Id. at 41-42 (emphasis added).
46. 1 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES
(photo. reprint 1991) (Boston, Hilliard, Gray & Co. 1833).
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Constitution.47 He also firmly rejected the idea that the separate people
groups of the several states formed the Constitution.48 In support of his
position that the people of America as a whole formed the Constitution,
Story placed great weight on the language of the Preamble of the
Constitution, which states that “the people of the United States” ordained
and established the Constitution.49 Story distinguished “the people of the
United States” as used in the Preamble from “the distinct people of a
particular state with the people of the other states.”50 Story approvingly
quoted Daniel Webster as maintaining, “So far from saying, that [the
Constitution] is established by the governments of the several states, it does
not even say, that it is established by the people of the several states. But it
pronounces, that it is established by the people of the United States in the
aggregate.”51 According to Story, therefore, the people of America as a
whole, not the separate people groups of the several states, formed the
Constitution.
3. Henry Baldwin
In 1837, Justice Henry Baldwin published a short work in which he
contended that the peoples of the several states, and not the people of
America as a whole, formed the Constitution.52 According to Baldwin, “The
people of a state, who had by their state constitution, granted the power of
legislation to their state legislatures; had plenary power, to take from them
such portions as they pleased, and by their grant vest them in a federal
legislature.”53 In other words, Baldwin maintained that the people of each
particular state revoked certain powers they had previously granted to their
individual state government, in order to re-grant these powers to a new
Federal Government.54 In Baldwin’s view, the people of each state took this

47. Id. at 281 n.2: “The constitution was neither made, nor ratified by the states, as
sovereignties, or political communities. It was framed by a convention, proposed to the
people of the states for their adoption by congress; and was adopted by state conventions,—
the immediate representatives of the people.”
48. Id. at 319.
49. U.S. CONST. pmbl.
50. 1 STORY, supra note 46, at 319; see also id. at 327.
51. Id. at 332. The quote from Webster proceeds: “Doubtless the people of the several
states, taken collectively, constitute the people of the United States. But it is in this their
collective capacity, it is as all the people of the United States, that they establish the
constitution.” Id.
52. BALDWIN, supra note 6.
53. Id. at 44.
54. Id. at 44-45.

186

LIBERTY UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 4:173

action for themselves as a people group distinct from the people groups of
the other states.55
4. Thomas Cooley
Writing in 1880, Thomas Cooley, a noted expositor of the Constitution
in his day, affirmed that the people of the several states formed the
Constitution and were parties to it.56 Cooley noted that the Constitution
“was submitted to the people of the several States” for ratification.57 By
adopting the Constitution thus submitted to them, “the people of the States,
as well as the States themselves, . . . became parties to it.”58 Furthermore,
Cooley maintained that the powers not granted to the Federal Government
in the Constitution “belong[] to the several States or to the people
thereof.”59 Cooley did not say that non-delegated powers belong to “the
people of America,” but rather that they belong to the people of “the several
States.”60 When placed alongside his previous statement that the people of
the several states ratified the Constitution, this subsequent statement
apparently means that it is the distinct people groups of the several states,
not one mass of people, who possess the powers not delegated to the
Federal Government.
Several important nineteenth-century constitutional scholars believed the
people groups of the several states formed the Constitution. At least one
notable exception among these scholars was Justice Story, who believed the
people of America acted as a unified whole in forming the Constitution.
This issue has not been settled definitively by the Supreme Court, although
it was addressed on two occasions by the United States Senate in the
nineteenth century. Is it possible to address this issue today with any
sureness and authority? Or is it hopelessly and forever irresolvable?

55. See, e.g., id. at 12-13, 44-45, 62, 97.
56. THOMAS M. COOLEY, THE GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW IN THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 26-27 (photo. reprint 2000) (Boston, Little, Brown & Co.
1880).
57. Id. at 26.
58. Id. at 26-27.
59. Id. at 29 (citing United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 550 (1875); SlaughterHouse Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1872); Gilman v. Philadelphia, 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 713
(1865); Briscoe v. Bank of Commonwealth of Ky., 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 257 (1837); Gibbons v.
Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 187 (1824); Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386 (1798)).
60. Id.
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III. THE CONTEMPORARY RESURRECTION OF THE DEBATE IN U.S. TERM
LIMITS, INC. V. THORNTON
In U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton,61 the Supreme Court held it was
unconstitutional for Arkansas to amend its Constitution to prohibit
candidates for the United States Congress from appearing on the general
election ballot in Arkansas for more than a specified number of terms.62
Justice Stevens penned the majority opinion;63 Justice Kennedy wrote a
concurring opinion; and Justice Thomas authored a dissenting opinion.64
From these various opinions, it is evident that the Justices disagreed over
whether the Constitution was formed by one people group or by many
people groups. This Part will examine the Justices’ views in turn.
A. Justice Stevens
Although Justice Stevens does not spend much time developing or
defending his view, his statements indicate that he believes one American
people group formed the Union. This is apparent from several observations.
First, Stevens quotes Marshall’s language in Sturges that the powers of the
states “‘proceed, not from the people of America, but from the people of
the several States . . . .’”65 In the context of Sturges, as noted above, this
language indicates that Marshall believed the people of America as a whole,
not the peoples of the several states, formed the Constitution.66 Stevens
appears to adopt Marshall’s position.
Second, Stevens maintains that the states reserved to themselves and
currently possess only those powers they originally possessed before the
Constitution was adopted.67 Stevens treats the issue in U.S. Term Limits as

61. U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779 (1995).
62. Id. at 783.
63. Justice Stevens was joined in his opinion by Justices Kennedy, Souter, Ginsburg,
and Breyer. Id. at 781.
64. Justice Thomas was joined in his dissenting opinion by Chief Justice Rehnquist and
Justices O’Connor and Scalia. Id.
65. Id. at 801 (quoting Sturges v. Crowninshield, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 122, 193 (1819)).
66. See supra notes 11-13, 22 and accompanying text.
67. U.S. Term Limits, 514 U.S. at 801-02. Stevens relies on several authorities for this
proposition: Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, 469 U.S. 528, 549
(1985) (“[T]he States unquestionably do retain a significant measure of sovereign authority.
They do so, however, only to the extent that the Constitution has not divested them of their
original powers and transferred those powers to the Federal Government.”); McCulloch v.
Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 430, 436 (1819); 2 STORY, supra note 46, at 101-02
(“[T]he states can exercise no powers whatsoever, which exclusively spring out of the
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whether the asserted right to fix representatives’ term limits is a right
reserved to the states under the Tenth Amendment.68 Apparently, he does
not consider the notion that the people of Arkansas can possess and exercise
certain rights that the Tenth Amendment reserves to them as “the people”
and not simply to the state governments. Rather, Stevens concludes that if
states are to be permitted “to craft their own qualifications for [their
Congressional representatives],”69 the Constitution must first be amended to
allow such state-imposed qualifications.70 Since Stevens treats the issue as
simply whether the right to add qualifications to those imposed by the
Constitution is reserved to the states,71 instead of also considering whether
such a right is reserved to the people, he is apparently assuming that “the
people” of the Tenth Amendment are not the people of a particular state,
such as Arkansas. If “the people” in the Tenth Amendment referred to the
individual people groups of the several states, Stevens’ analysis would be
patently incomplete. It is probable, therefore, that Stevens views “the
people” as being the one people of America as a whole.72
Third, Stevens asserts as a “basic principle” that “the right to choose
representatives belongs not to the States, but to the people.”73 The context
of this statement indicates that Stevens’ understanding of “the people” here
is that they are one national entity.74 Furthermore, Stevens states that in the
case at hand, “the voters of Arkansas . . . were acting as citizens of the State
of Arkansas, and not as citizens of the National Government. The people of
the State of Arkansas have no more power than does the Arkansas
existence of the national government, which the constitution does not delegate to them. . . .
No state can say, that it has reserved, what it never possessed.”).
68. U.S. Term Limits, 514 U.S. at 800 (“[W]e conclude that the power to add
qualifications is not within the ‘original powers’ of the States, and thus is not reserved to the
States by the Tenth Amendment.”).
69. Id. at 838.
70. Id. at 783, 838.
71. Id. at 800-01.
72. This implication from Stevens’ mode of analysis obtains further support from the
fact that Stevens maintained that the right to impose state-specific qualifications on
Congressional representatives may be permitted by constitutional amendment. Id. at 783,
838. The process of constitutional amendment is a national process. Presumably, Stevens
would recognize that it is the people who act, through their representatives, to amend their
Constitution. Thus, perhaps implicit in Stevens’ analysis is the idea that the right to impose
additional qualifications on representatives is a right possessed by the people of America as
a whole, not by the states, and that the American people can exercise this right by amending
their Constitution.
73. U.S. Term Limits, 514 U.S. at 820-21.
74. Id. at 821-22. Consider, for example, this statement by Stevens: “The Constitution
thus creates a uniform national body representing the interests of a single people.” Id. at 822.
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Legislature to supplement the qualifications for service in Congress.”75
From this assertion it is evident that Stevens does not interpret “the people”
in the Tenth Amendment to mean (among other peoples) the people of
Arkansas. Apparently, Stevens’ framework for interpreting the Tenth
Amendment is that “the states” in the Tenth Amendment refer to the
governments or the populaces of the individual states, and that “the people”
refers to all of the “citizens of the National Government” acting as one
group.76
B. Justice Kennedy
Justice Kennedy is quite explicit and unequivocal in expressing his view
on who formed the Union: “In my view . . . it is well settled that the whole
people of the United States asserted their political identity and unity of
purpose when they created the federal system.”77 Again: “[T]he National
Government . . . owes its existence to the act of the whole people who
created it.”78 According to Kennedy, it was the people of America acting en
masse, and not the peoples of the several states, who formed the Union.
Referring to “a relationship between the people of the Nation and their
National Government, with which the States may not interfere,”79 Kennedy
apparently interprets this relationship between the Federal Government and
75. Id. at 822 n.32.
76. In addition to the statements of Stevens already discussed, there is another statement
that supports this understanding of Stevens’ view. Stevens maintains the Framers intended
“that neither Congress nor the States should possess the power to supplement the exclusive
qualifications set forth in the text of the Constitution.” Id. at 827. Since the people of
Arkansas attempted to exercise this power, and Stevens denied the validity of this attempt on
the grounds that the “states” do not possess this power, Stevens is implicitly viewing the
people of a particular state as falling under the same category (that of a “state” for purposes
of the Tenth Amendment) as a state government, rather than under a different category (that
of “people”).
77. Id. at 838 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (emphasis added). Kennedy proceeds to
criticize Justice Thomas’ dissent (which maintains that thirteen people groups formed the
Constitution) in these words: “The dissent’s course of reasoning suggesting otherwise might
be construed to disparage the republican character of the National Government, and it seems
appropriate to add these few remarks to explain why that course of argumentation runs
counter to fundamental principles of federalism.” Id. Evidently, Kennedy deems this issue
important enough to deal with more explicitly in his concurring opinion than Stevens does in
the majority opinion. As Kennedy observes, this issue implicates the very heart of the
American system of government, concerning as it does “the republican character of the
National Government” and “fundamental principles of federalism.” Id.
78. Id. at 839 (emphasis added).
79. Id. at 845.
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the American people as a whole to mean that the people of Arkansas
cannot, as the people of a single state, intrude upon ground that belongs
exclusively to the Federal Government or to the entire people of America.80
The important point to note from Kennedy’s reasoning is that there seems
to be three possible repositories of rights or powers: the Federal
Government, the states, or the American people conceived of as one entity.
For Kennedy, the people who can relate to, respond to, and act with respect
to the Federal Government are the American people en masse, not the
distinct peoples of the several states.
C. Justice Thomas
Like Justice Kennedy, Justice Thomas makes his position clear: “The
ultimate source of the Constitution’s authority is the consent of the people
of each individual State, not the consent of the undifferentiated people of
the Nation as a whole.”81 Thomas maintains that “the people of each
State”—not the people of America as a whole—possess “the power to
prescribe eligibility requirements for the candidates who seek to represent
them in Congress.”82
Thomas defends his view by appealing to the manner in which the
Constitution was originally ratified.83 As Thomas explains, “The
Constitution took effect once it had been ratified by the people gathered in
convention in nine different States. But the Constitution went into effect
only ‘between the States so ratifying the same’; it did not bind the people of
North Carolina until they had accepted it.”84 In other words, Thomas is
saying that the very nature of the ratification process implies that the people
of America did not act as one undifferentiated whole to ratify the
Constitution.85
80. Id. at 844-45.
81. Id. at 846 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
82. Id. at 845.
83. Id. at 846. Thomas also cites James Madison in support of the proposition that the
people of the several states formed the Constitution. Thomas cites THE FEDERALIST NO. 39,
at 243 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961), as well as Madison’s remarks at the
Virginia ratification convention, 3 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS, ON
THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION, AS RECOMMENDED BY THE GENERAL
CONVENTION AT PHILADELPHIA IN 1787, at 94 (photo. reprint 1996) (J. Elliot ed., 2d ed.,
Philadelphia, J. B. Lippincott Co. 1891) [hereinafter ELLIOT’S DEBATES].
84. U.S. Term Limits, 514 U.S. at 846 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (citation omitted)
(quoting U.S. CONST. art. VII).
85. Indeed, one may further observe that since Article VII of the Constitution did not
require unanimous ratification by the states for the Constitution to become effective, it was
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According to Thomas, “the people of each State” adopted the
Constitution and in so doing “surrendered some of their authority to the
United States.”86 Thomas’ words here express the view that it was not the
people of America as a whole who delegated powers to the Federal
Government. Rather, Thomas is arguing that the Federal Government
derives its powers from the numerous distinct people groups of those states
that ratified the Constitution. In Thomas’ view, “the people of the several
States are the only true source of power . . . .”87 For Thomas, therefore,
power rests with the people of each individual state, not with the people of
America en masse.88
Thomas interprets the Tenth Amendment to mean that all powers not
delegated to the Federal Government “reside at the state level.”89 In
Thomas’ words, “All powers that the Constitution neither delegates to the
Federal Government nor prohibits to the States are controlled by the people
of each State.”90 Essentially, Thomas is saying that the powers reserved to
“the people” under the Tenth Amendment are reserved to the people of each
individual state, not to the people of America as a whole. The peoples of the
states hold the reserved powers, not the people of the nation. In fact,
Thomas asserts that “it would make no sense to speak of powers as being
reserved to the undifferentiated people of the Nation as a whole, because
the Constitution does not contemplate that those people will either exercise
power or delegate it.”91 Thomas maintains that the Constitution does not
provide for any type of action to be taken by the people of America acting
as one undifferentiated mass of people.92

not even certain historically that the Constitution would end up binding all of the people of
America, instead of merely binding the people of nine states. See 3 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra
note 83, at 94 (James Madison’s remarks at the Virginia ratification convention).
86. U.S. Term Limits, 514 U.S. at 847 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
87. Id.
88. See also id. at 851 (“The Constitution derives its authority . . . from the consent of
the people of the States. [It is a] fundamental principle that all governmental powers stem
from the people of the States . . . .”).
89. Id. at 848.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id.
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IV. THE SOLUTION TO THE DEBATE AS PROVIDED BY HISTORICAL
RECORDS
Much is at stake with the interpretation of “people” in the Tenth
Amendment.93 The proper interpretation of “people” depends on the
political status of “the people” before the Constitution was formed, as well
as the manner in which “the people” ratified the Constitution. Also, it is
helpful to ascertain the views of certain prominent Founding Fathers
regarding the political composition of “the people” of the United States. An
investigation of this historical evidence will demonstrate that “the people”
who formed the Constitution94 and “the people” who possess reserved
powers under the Tenth Amendment95 are the distinct people groups of the
several states, not one undifferentiated, national people group.
A. The Pre-Constitutional Political Status of the People
To ascertain the pre-constitutional legal status of the people of the
United States, it is necessary to examine such key historical documents as
the Declaration of Independence,96 the Articles of Confederation,97 and the
Treaty of Peace between the United States and Great Britain in 1783.98
These documents demonstrate the way in which the people of the United
States viewed themselves during the years immediately preceding the
adoption of the Constitution.99
1. The Declaration of Independence
The title of the Declaration of Independence itself asserts that this
document is a declaration of thirteen states, not of one political entity: “The
unanimous Declaration of the thirteen united States of America.”100
Moreover, the signers of the Declaration referred to themselves as “the
Representatives of the United States of America,”101 indicating that they
viewed themselves as representing a group of states, not a single entity. The
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.

See supra Part I.
U.S. CONST. pmbl.
U.S. CONST. amend. X.
THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE (U.S. 1776).
THE ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION (U.S. 1781).
The Definitive Treaty of Peace, U.S.-Gr. Brit., Sept. 3, 1783, TREATIES AND
CONVENTIONS CONCLUDED BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND OTHER POWERS,
SINCE JULY 4, 1776, at 314-18 (photo. reprint 2006) (rev. ed., Washington, Government
Printing Office 1873) [hereinafter Treaty of Peace].
99. The Constitution was drafted in 1787.
100. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE (U.S. 1776).
101. Id.
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Declaration speaks of “one people” and “the People” in the context of
general principles of legal philosophy applicable to all peoples at all times
in history.102 Notably, however, when the Declaration begins to apply these
general principles to the specific situation in America in 1776, it speaks of
“the patient sufferance of these Colonies” and of “the necessity which
constrains them to alter their former Systems of Government.”103 This
language indicates that the signers of the Declaration of Independence
viewed the people of the United States to be acting as separate and distinct
people groups in achieving their political separation from Great Britain. It
was the colonies, not the nation, who altered their governments.
Presumably, each colony had to act for itself to alter its own “system of
government,” since the people of one colony would have had no legal right
to participate in the process of changing the political system of another
colony. The people of each individual colony had to alter that colony’s
“system of government” for themselves.
Another indication in the Declaration of Independence that the people of
the United States were not simply one undifferentiated people group in
1776 may be found in the following language: “[T]hese United Colonies
are, and of Right ought to be Free and Independent States; . . . as [such],
they have full Power to levy War, conclude Peace, contract Alliances,
establish Commerce, and to do all other Acts and Things which
Independent States may of right do.”104 In other words, each state asserted
the right to exercise the full powers of an independent nation, including the
powers to wage war, negotiate peace, make treaties, and establish
international commerce. Thus, before the adoption of the Articles of
Confederation in 1781, the American states were not formally united in a
legal or political way. Under such a situation, it is difficult to maintain that
the people of America comprised one undifferentiated people group that
acted as one popular mass. How can a people be viewed as one entity
instead of as thirteen separate entities when there are no legal bonds
actually uniting that people?105 The more sensible understanding seems to
102. Id.
103. Id. (emphasis added).
104. Id.
105. Even if one assumes arguendo that the adoption of the Constitution was a legal
bond uniting the people of the United States into one single people group for all purposes
thereafter, one must realize that the Constitution could not actually have been formed by one
people group. If the Constitution was what united the people of America into a single people
group, then they were not one people group before the Constitution made them so. In the act
of forming and adopting the instrument that made them one people group, the people could
not yet have been acting as one people group. Thirteen people groups may act as thirteen
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be that with the Declaration of Independence, the people of the United
States consisted of thirteen separate and independent people groups, who
when they acted, had to act as independent groups rather than as a simple,
single body.
2. The Articles of Confederation
The Articles of Confederation formed a limited general government over
the American states in 1781. The Articles were unequivocally formed by
the state governments themselves, not by the people.106 Thus, the only
document creating a pre-constitutional legal bond between the states was
created by the state governments, not by the people. There is no basis for
supposing that the political composition of “the people of the United
States” changed with the adoption of the Articles of Confederation. If after
the Declaration of Independence and before the Articles of Confederation,
“the people” consisted of the people groups of the several states,
independently considered, the adoption of the Articles did nothing to alter
this situation. The actions of the state governments in uniting for certain
specified, limited purposes could not have imposed a radical change in the
basic structural composition of the people. If independent people groups are
to be united into one undifferentiated people group, this act of structural
redefinition, to be valid, must be performed by the people themselves.107
The people of the United States did not alter their structural composition
when their state governments adopted the Articles of Confederation.
3. The Treaty of Peace with Great Britain
Two years after the Articles of Confederation were adopted in 1781, the
United States and Great Britain entered into a peace treaty that formally
concluded the American War for Independence.108 The language in this
Treaty indicates that the people of the United States were viewed by both

people groups to make themselves one people group, but thirteen people groups cannot act
as one people group to make themselves one people group. Rather, they only become one
people group after they have completed the legal and political act that actually makes them
one people.
106. THE ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION (U.S. 1781); see id. art. III (stating that the states
are the ones entering into “a firm league of friendship with each other”); id. art. XIII
(indicating that the signers of the Articles understood that each of them represented the
legislature of his own state).
107. See THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776) (“Governments . . .
deriv[e] their just powers from the consent of the governed, . . . [and] it is the Right of the
People . . . to institute new Government . . . .”).
108. Treaty of Peace, supra note 98.
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King George III and the United States Government as a collection of
distinct people groups belonging to particular states.
In Article I of the Treaty, King George “acknowledges the said United
States, viz. [the original thirteen states listed by name], to be free, sovereign
and independent States . . . .”109 Two important points should be noted here.
First, the “United States” were not presented as one homogeneous nation,
but as a collection of individual states that had banded together. Today,
people think of one national government when they refer to the “United
States.” This Treaty, however, used the term “United States” to refer to
thirteen distinct, free, and independent states. Second, this formal Treaty
explicitly recognized that the United States were “free, sovereign and
independent States.”110 This idea logically precludes the notion that the
people of America were one undifferentiated whole. How can a single
political constituency be governed by thirteen sovereign political entities
that are independent of one another? In 1783, the people of the United
States could not have been one undifferentiated whole, at least for political
purposes.111
Article VII of the Treaty refers to “His Britannic Majesty and the said
States” and then proceeds to mention “the subjects of the one and the
citizens of the other.”112 Thus, the people of the United States were viewed
as being citizens of their respective states, not as citizens of one national
government. Not only were the United States independent political
governments, but also the people themselves were citizens of those
individual, free states, not of one common political government. For
political purposes, the people of America were not one people before the
Constitution was adopted, but thirteen distinct peoples. The question now

109. Id. at 315.
110. Id.
111. Of course, the people of the United States at that time were very closely united in
terms of their religion and culture. People groups that are ruled by separate political
governments can be united in non-political ways. For example, a common religion, such as
Christianity or Islam, may unite peoples from different nations. In a sense, European
Christians living in the Middle Ages were one people. Indeed, a people united by a common
religion or common culture would probably feel a greater sense of unity than would a people
simply united by a common political government. This is so because culture, beliefs, and
ideas are more fundamental to human nature and identity than political governance. A sense
of political unity will not necessarily overcome fundamental differences in thought and
culture. There are many different ways in which a people may be spoken of as “one people.”
This Note is simply examining whether the American people were “one people” in the
political sense of that phrase.
112. Treaty of Peace, supra note 98, at 317.
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becomes whether the people consolidated themselves into one political
popular entity when they formed the Constitution.
B. The Ratification Process
On its face, the very process by which the Constitution was ratified
demonstrates that the people of the United States did not act as one
undifferentiated people in the formation of their Constitution.113 If the
people of each state could decide for themselves and for their own state
whether they would be part of the new Federal Government, this implies
that even an overwhelming majority of the American people could not force
the entirety of the people in America to be ruled by the Constitution.114
Moreover, the Constitution only required the consent of “the Conventions
of nine States” to establish the Constitution “between the States so ratifying
the Same.”115 In other words, the people of America did not have to decide
113. Henry Baldwin explained this argument eloquently when he wrote that it would be
erroneous
if we so take the words of the preamble of the proposed constitution, as to be a
declaration that the political existence, and organic power of the several states
and people, had become so amalgamated into one body of supreme power, as
to make it the sole grantor of the powers of the federal government, and
competent to restrict the states, and control existing state constitutions. Their
letter to congress, and of the latter to the several state legislatures, asking
separate conventions of the people in each to ratify it; was an act indicating
political fatuity, if the instrument contained, and was intended to be a
declaration, that when ratified by such conventions of nine states, and thus
established, it was not “by the people of the several states,” but of all
collectively.
BALDWIN, supra note 6, at 62; see also THE FEDERALIST NO. 39, at 239-40 (James Madison)
(Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). Madison stated, “Each State, in ratifying the Constitution, is
considered as a sovereign body independent of all others, and only to be bound by its own
voluntary act.” Id. at 240. Madison viewed the process of state-by-state ratification as
demonstrating that the formation of the Constitution was “the act of the people, as forming
so many independent States, not as forming one aggregate nation.” Id.
114. 3 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 83, at 94 (James Madison’s remarks at the Virginia
ratification convention). In Madison’s words:
Were [the Federal Government under the Constitution] a consolidated
government, the assent of a majority of the people would be sufficient for its
establishment; and, as a majority have adopted it already, the remaining states
would be bound by the act of the majority, even if they unanimously reprobated
it. Were it such a government as is suggested, it would be now binding on the
people of this state, without having had the privilege of deliberating upon it.
But, sir, no state is bound by it, as it is, without its own consent.
Id.; see also THE FEDERALIST NO. 39, at 240 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
115. U.S. CONST. art. VII.
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as a whole whether they would all be ruled by the Constitution. Rather, the
people of each state were to make this decision for themselves.116 As Henry
Baldwin observed, “all must agree, that when [the Constitution] was
proposed for adoption in 1787, it could not be foreseen which of the states
would so ratify it; the states therefore could not be named till their separate
ratifications were given.”117 Thus, Baldwin concluded that the reference in
the Constitution’s Preamble to “the People of the United States”118 is an
adaptable phrase that refers generally to the people of those states that have
chosen to ratify the Constitution.119 According to Baldwin, the Preamble
should be interpreted to mean that “‘[t]he people’ ‘of the several states,
which may be included within this Union,’ [are] the constituent power of
the federal government.”120
C. The Ratification Conventions
The formal ratifications of the Constitution by the original thirteen states
indicate that the representatives of the people in each of the state ratification
conventions understood that they were acting on behalf of the people of
their own respective states.
1. Delaware121
In Delaware’s ratification of the Constitution, the delegates identified
themselves as “the deputies of the people of the Delaware state, in
Convention met.”122 They declared that they ratified the Constitution “in
virtue of the power and authority [given to them], for and in behalf of
[themselves] and [their] constituents.”123 Thus, the delegates in the
Delaware convention understood that they were acting on behalf of the
116. 3 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 83, at 94 (James Madison’s remarks at the Virginia
ratification convention) (“[N]o state is bound . . . without its own consent.”); THE
FEDERALIST NO. 39, at 239-40 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961); see BALDWIN,
supra note 6, at 97.
117. BALDWIN, supra note 6, at 97.
118. U.S. CONST. pmbl.
119. BALDWIN, supra note 6, at 97. Baldwin stated that “at each period when any state
ratified [the Constitution],” that state “became one of ‘the United States of America,’ by the
act of the people of the states respectively.” Id. Baldwin also maintained that “the term
‘people,’ was a mere designation of the power by which the constitution was made.” Id.
Baldwin viewed the term “people” in the Preamble as simply signifying that the Constitution
was ratified by the people as opposed to some other alleged source of authority. Id.
120. Id.
121. This Note will discuss the state ratifications in their chronological order.
122. 1 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 83, at 319.
123. Id.

198

LIBERTY UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 4:173

people of the state of Delaware. There was no pretention on their part to be
acting as an incomplete portion of a larger, undifferentiated people group.
The power of the Delaware delegates came from their “constituents,” the
people of Delaware. The people of Delaware, through their elected
representatives, acted on their own to ratify the Constitution for themselves.
Their ratification bound only themselves. It was up to the other twelve
states to ratify the Constitution, each on its own behalf.
2. Pennsylvania
Pennsylvania’s ratification was similar to Delaware’s. “[T]he delegates
of the people of the commonwealth of Pennsylvania” ratified the
Constitution “in the name and by the authority of the same people, and for
[the delegates themselves].”124 The Pennsylvania delegates understood they
were acting for the people of Pennsylvania. There is no indication in the
language of their ratification that they viewed themselves as merely one
segment of a larger homogeneous popular entity. The delegates derived
their authority from the people of Pennsylvania, not from the people of the
United States, and as the heading of their ratification declared, they ratified
the Constitution “In the Name of the People of Pennsylvania.”125 Evidently,
the people of Pennsylvania constituted a political entity that could act as
one body either to accept or to reject the new Constitution.
During the debates in the Pennsylvania convention, James Wilson, one
of Pennsylvania’s delegates to the Constitutional Convention, offered some
remarks on the Preamble of the new Constitution and its significance.
Wilson stated that the Preamble incorporates the principle that “the supreme
power resides in the people.”126 Contrasting the nature of British and
American government, Wilson noted that under the Magna Charta, the
rights of Englishmen were granted to them by the king, whereas under the
American Constitution, the rights of American citizens resided in “the
people at large,” who did not relinquish their rights by forming the
Constitution.127 Thus, Wilson concluded that a Bill of Rights enumerating
the rights reserved to the American people “would be not only unnecessary,
but preposterous and dangerous.”128 Besides referring to “the people at
large,”129 Wilson also declared that “in this Constitution, the citizens of the
United States appear dispensing a part of their original power in what
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.

Id.
Id.
2 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 83, at 434.
Id. at 435.
Id. at 436.
Id. at 435.
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manner and what proportion they think fit.”130 Again, Wilson asserted, “[t]o
every suggestion concerning a bill of rights, the citizens of the United States
may always say, We reserve the right to do what we please.”131
It is unclear whether Wilson was intending by his references to “the
citizens of the United States” and “the people at large” to contrast the
people of America as a whole with the peoples of the several states. At the
very least, it is evident from the context that Wilson was contrasting the
people as the source of their rights with the civil government as the source
of political rights. However, even granting that Wilson viewed the people
of the United States as one undifferentiated whole, this does not imply that
the other Pennsylvania delegates agreed with Wilson on this point. Rather,
the plain language of the delegates acting as a group in their ratification of
the Constitution declared that they were acting “in the name and by the
authority of the [people of Pennsylvania],”132 not on behalf of a mere subset
of a larger entity. The clear language of Pennsylvania’s official ratification
discussed above is more authoritative than an argument based on
implications from one delegate’s personal language. Even if Wilson viewed
the people of America as one simple people mass, the other Pennsylvania
delegates certainly gave no indication that they agreed with Wilson on that
point. Indeed, the language of Pennsylvania’s ratification indicates the
delegates generally viewed the people of Pennsylvania as a politically
independent entity.
3. New Jersey
The New Jersey ratification cited the resolutions by the New Jersey
legislature regarding the holding of a ratification convention in that state.
One of these resolutions declared that the delegates elected to the
convention would have power to ratify the Constitution “in behalf and on
the part of this state.”133 In other words, it was the state of New Jersey (i.e.,
the people of New Jersey acting through their elected delegates) that
ratified the Constitution. Acknowledging themselves to be “the delegates of
the state of New Jersey, chosen by the people thereof,” the delegates
ratified the Constitution “for and on the behalf of the people of the said
state of New Jersey.”134 Thus, the New Jersey delegates understood
themselves to represent their own state (i.e., the people of the state), not a
130. Id. at 437 (emphasis added).
131. Id. (emphasis added).
132. 1 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 83, at 319; see also supra notes 124-25 and
accompanying text.
133. 1 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 83, at 320.
134. Id. at 321.
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portion of a larger political entity. In ratifying the Constitution, the
delegates were acting on behalf of and expressing the will of the people of
New Jersey. Their decision to ratify the Constitution bound only the people
group of New Jersey.
4. Connecticut
Connecticut’s ratification was quite brief. The delegates identified
themselves as “the delegates of the people of [the] state [of Connecticut]”
and declared that they ratified the Constitution.135 Significantly, just as the
Pennsylvania ratification had done,136 the Connecticut ratification contained
a heading that read, “In the Name of the People of the State of
Connecticut.”137 In other words, the people of the state of Connecticut
viewed themselves as a self-contained body that could meet separately from
the peoples of the other states and decide for themselves as an independent
people group whether to ratify the new Constitution.
5. Massachusetts
The Massachusetts delegates stated that they ratified the Constitution “in
the name and in behalf of the people of the commonwealth of
Massachusetts.”138 Thus, the people of Massachusetts came together as a
body through their delegates and gave their corporate assent to the
Constitution. There is some language in Massachusetts’ ratification that
seems upon first glance to intimate the view that the people of America
were a single entity. The delegates referred to the opportunity of “the
people of the United States” to “enter[] into an explicit and solemn compact
with each other, by assenting to and ratifying a new Constitution.”139 One
might interpret this language to mean that the Massachusetts delegates
viewed the people of America as acting as one large group to form the
Constitution. However, this interpretation seems implausible when one
considers certain other language in Massachusetts’ ratification.
Interestingly, the Massachusetts convention recommended several
amendments to the Constitution, the first of which was: “That it be
explicitly declared that all powers not expressly delegated by the aforesaid
Constitution are reserved to the several states, to be by them exercised.”140
The Massachusetts convention thus was concerned to clarify that non135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.

Id.
Id. at 319.
Id. at 321.
Id. at 322.
Id.
Id.
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delegated powers were reserved to the states. Although the Tenth
Amendment says that non-delegated powers “are reserved to the States
respectively, or to the people,”141 Massachusetts did not mention the people
as a reservoir of non-delegated rights. Since it was the people of
Massachusetts, acting through their delegates, who ratified the Constitution,
it would not make much sense to interpret their recommendation to mean
that each state government possesses all powers the Federal Government
does not possess. Rather, it seems more reasonable to interpret
Massachusetts’ proposed amendment to mean that the peoples of the states
possess all powers they do not expressly delegate to the Federal
Government. If the people of Massachusetts were adopting the
Constitution, they would naturally want to clarify their own reserved rights.
The people of Massachusetts apparently viewed reserved rights as residing
in the peoples of each individual state, not in the people of America as a
single whole. This is why they could say that “all powers not expressly
delegated . . . are reserved to the several states . . . .”142
6. Georgia
Identifying themselves as “the delegates of the people of the state of
Georgia,” the delegates to the Georgia convention ratified the Constitution
“in virtue of the powers and authority [given to them] by the people of the
said state for that purpose, for and in behalf of [themselves] and [their]
constituents.”143 The people of Georgia vested their delegates with power to
ratify the Constitution for and on behalf of the people of Georgia. There is
no indication here that the people of Georgia or their delegates viewed
themselves as acting as a mere district of a larger political entity, instead of
as a politically independent and self-contained people group.
7. Maryland
Maryland’s ratification is short. The delegates stated they were “the
delegates of the people of the state of Maryland,” and then declared that
they ratified the Constitution “for [themselves], and in the name and on the
behalf of the people of [the] state [of Maryland].”144 The Maryland
delegates were explicitly acting for the people of their state as a whole. The
idea that they were acting as a mere voting district of a larger populace is a
notion that must be read into their actions, for it does not appear upon the
141.
142.
143.
144.

U.S. CONST. amend. X.
1 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 83, at 322 (emphasis added).
Id. at 324.
Id.
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face of their language. Rather, the prima facie sense of Maryland’s
ratification (as well as the other states’ ratifications) is that the people of an
independent, sovereign state met via their delegates and decided as an
independent body that they would join the new constitutional Union.
8. South Carolina
South Carolina’s ratification was typical. It began, “In Convention of the
people of the state of South Carolina, by their representatives . . . .”145 The
Convention ratified the Constitution “in the name and behalf of the people
of [the] state [of South Carolina].”146 Like Massachusetts, the South
Carolina convention declared that nothing in the Constitution “warrants a
construction that the states do not retain every power not expressly
relinquished by them, and vested in the general government of the
Union.”147 According to this language from the South Carolina convention,
the states were the parties who relinquished certain powers which were then
vested in the Federal Government. However, the South Carolina convention
was explicitly acting on behalf of the people, not the state government, of
South Carolina.148 It is not reasonable to interpret the South Carolina
convention as saying that the people of South Carolina ratified the
Constitution, but that any rights the people did not give the Federal
Government were retained by the state government.149 Rather, the
reasonable interpretation of South Carolina’s declaration that the states
retain non-delegated powers is that the people of each individual state retain
all powers not delegated to the Federal Government. If the people are the
ones delegating certain powers, then it must be the people who are the ones
retaining all non-delegated powers.
9. New Hampshire
The “Convention of the Delegates of the People of the State of New
Hampshire”150 ratified the Constitution “in the name and behalf of the

145. Id. at 325.
146. Id.
147. Id. (emphasis added).
148. Id.
149. How can a state government retain what it did not have in the first place? If all nondelegated rights are retained by the state governments, then this logically implies that the
people have no rights, and that they had no rights to begin with. To say that South Carolina
advocated this notion is simply not historically credible.
150. 1 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 83, at 325 (from the heading of New Hampshire’s
ratification).
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people of the state of New Hampshire.”151 In addition to Massachusetts and
South Carolina, New Hampshire was another state that recommended a
constitutional amendment regarding reserved rights. New Hampshire
proposed: “That it be explicitly declared that all powers not expressly and
particularly delegated by the aforesaid Constitution are reserved to the
several states, to be by them exercised.”152 New Hampshire did not say that
non-delegated powers were reserved to the American people as a whole, but
to “the several states.” Surely the delegates representing the people of New
Hampshire were not asserting that all powers not delegated to the Federal
Government necessarily resided in the state governments. Rather, the
people of New Hampshire evidently wanted to reserve rights to themselves
as a people. While Americans of the founding era generally understood that
people have rights, many of them apparently viewed these rights as residing
in the separate people groups of the several states, not in one national
people group en masse.
10. Virginia
The delegates of the Virginia ratification convention, “the delegates of
the people of Virginia, duly elected,”153 ratified the Constitution “in the
name and in behalf of the people of Virginia.”154 Again, the people of this
particular state155 ratified the Constitution for themselves as a distinct
people group. There is some language in Virginia’s ratification that upon a
cursory glance seems to indicate that the American people are one single
people group. The delegates maintained that “the powers granted under the
Constitution, being derived from the people of the United States, may be
resumed by them, whensoever the same shall be perverted to their injury or
oppression, and that every power not granted thereby remains with
them.”156 One might wish to interpret “the people of the United States” here
as indicating the people of America conceived of as one single entity.
However, Virginia proposed the following amendment to the Constitution:
“That each state in the Union shall respectively retain every power,
jurisdiction, and right, which is not by this Constitution delegated to the
[Federal Government].”157 Once again, an original ratifying state insisted
that the powers not delegated to the Federal Government were retained by
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.

Id. at 326.
Id. (emphasis added).
Id. at 327.
Id.
Or, more properly, this particular commonwealth.
1 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 83, at 327.
3 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 83, at 659.
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each respective state in the Union. As noted above with respect to similar
amendments proposed by other states,158 it is much more reasonable to
interpret the term “state” in this context as referring to the people of each
individual state, rather than to the government of each state, especially
since the Virginia ratification spoke of “the people of the United States” as
retaining all powers not granted to the Federal Government by the
Constitution.159 If Virginia can say that “the people” retain non-delegated
powers, and that “each state” retains non-delegated powers, then “the
people” must mean the people of each state, not the people of the nation as
a whole.
11. New York
The members of New York’s ratification convention identified
themselves as “the delegates of the people of the state of New York, duly
elected,”160 and ratified the Constitution “in the name and in the behalf of
the people of the state of New York.”161 The New York convention made
numerous declarations in its ratification, including the declaration “that
every power, jurisdiction, and right, which is not by the . . . Constitution
clearly delegated to the [Federal Government], remains to the people of the
several states, or to their respective state governments, to whom they may
have granted the same . . . .”162 This statement seems to resemble the Tenth
Amendment more closely than the proposed amendments by other states
considered above. New York’s language straightforwardly expresses the
understanding that non-delegated powers are reserved to the people groups
of each state as such, not to the people of America as a single entity.
According to New York’s declaration here, the people of each state possess
all powers they have not delegated to either the Federal Government or
their own state government.
12. North Carolina
North Carolina and Rhode Island were the only original states that did
not ratify the Constitution until after the Federal Government was already
established under the new Constitution.163 A North Carolina convention
ratified the Constitution on November 21, 1789, “in behalf of the freemen,

158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.

See supra notes 140-42, 147-49, 152 and accompanying text.
1 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 83, at 327 (emphasis added).
Id.
Id. at 329.
Id. at 327.
See id. at 333, 335.

2009]

U.S. TERM LIMITS, INC. V. THORNTON

205

citizens and inhabitants of the state of North Carolina.”164 A previous North
Carolina convention that had failed to ratify the Constitution had proposed
numerous amendments to the Constitution, the first of which was: “That
each state in the Union shall respectively retain every power, jurisdiction,
and right, which is not by this Constitution delegated to the [Federal
Government].”165 As with many states already examined,166 North Carolina
viewed the people and governments of each state, not the people of the
country as a whole, as retaining the rights not delegated to the Federal
Government. Rights that belong to “each state in the Union . . .
respectively”167 may belong to either the people or the government of each
state, but they logically cannot belong to the people of America considered
as one undifferentiated people group.
13. Rhode Island
Finally, Rhode Island ratified the Constitution on May 29, 1790.168
“[T]he delegates of the people of the state of Rhode Island and Providence
Plantations, duly elected,”169 ratified the Constitution “in the name and in
the behalf of the people of the state of Rhode Island and Providence
Plantations.”170 There are some places where the Rhode Island delegates
generically mentioned “the people,” which by itself could be interpreted as
referring to either one people group or many people groups. The delegates
affirmed that “all power is naturally vested in, and consequently derived
from, the people,”171 and that “the powers of government may be reassumed
by the people whensoever it shall become necessary to their happiness.”172
Immediately after these statements, however, the delegates made it clear
who “the people” were to whom they were referring:
[T]he rights of the states respectively to nominate and appoint all
state officers, and every other power, jurisdiction, and right,
which is not by the said Constitution clearly delegated to [the
Federal Government], remain to the people of the several states,
164. Id. at 333.
165. 4 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 83, at 244.
166. See supra notes 140-42, 147-49, 152, 157-59, 162 and accompanying text.
167. 4 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 83, at 244 (emphasis added).
168. 1 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 83, at 335. Rhode Island was the only one of the
original thirteen states that sent no delegates to the Constitutional Convention in
Philadelphia. See id. at 332.
169. Id. at 334.
170. Id. at 335.
171. Id. at 334.
172. Id.
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or their respective state governments, to whom they may have
granted the same . . . .173
The Rhode Island delegates understood that the people of the several states,
not the people of the nation acting as one single entity, were the source of
the Federal Government’s powers and the repository of all non-delegated
powers.
In its ratification, Rhode Island also proposed various amendments to the
Constitution, the very first of which was: “The United States shall guaranty
to each state its sovereignty, freedom, and independence, and every power,
jurisdiction, and right, which is not by this Constitution expressly delegated
to the United States.”174 Even if one interprets the language here of
“sovereignty, freedom, and independence” to refer to the rights and powers
of the state governments instead of the rights and powers of the people, one
cannot fairly interpret the Rhode Island delegates as saying that “every
power, jurisdiction, and right” that is not delegated to the Federal
Government resides in the state governments. This interpretation would
leave the people themselves no rights or powers at all, but would relegate
all rights and powers to either the Federal Government or the state
governments. As noted above with respect to similar amendments proposed
by other states,175 this language is most reasonably interpreted to mean that
the people of each respective state possess the rights and powers they have
not delegated to either their state government or the Federal Government.
The important point, however, is to note that the language both of this
amendment proposed by Rhode Island and of similar amendments proposed
by other states cannot grammatically be interpreted to refer to one great
national body of people possessing rights en masse as a single entity. Rhode
Island specifically asserted that non-delegated powers reside with states in
their individual capacity, which precludes the notion that rights reside in a
national people group.
Thus, the delegates in every single one of the original thirteen states
ratified the Constitution on behalf of the people of their own state.
Delegates representing the people of each state came together
independently of the people of other states and decided whether to adopt the
Constitution for their own state. Five of the original thirteen states proposed
amending the Constitution to recognize essentially that non-delegated rights
and powers were retained by the people of the several states or their state

173. Id. (emphasis added).
174. Id. at 336.
175. See supra notes 140-42, 147-49, 152, 157-59, 165-67 and accompanying text.

2009]

U.S. TERM LIMITS, INC. V. THORNTON

207

governments.176 Two other states made declarations to this same effect.177
The evidence surrounding the actual ratification of the Constitution by the
individual state ratification conventions strongly suggests the conclusion
that the people of the United States did not act as a single political people
group to ratify the Constitution, but rather acted as politically independent
people groups to ratify the Constitution, each state for itself.
D. The Views of Particular Founding Fathers
In addition to the preceding historical evidence concerning the preconstitutional political status of “the people” and the state ratification
conventions, the views of two prominent statesmen during the Founding
Era further demonstrate that the people of America were not viewed as one
homogeneous political entity. Statements by both James Madison and
Thomas Jefferson indicate that these Founders viewed the people of the
United States as composed of separate political entities—the people groups
of the several states.
1. James Madison
During the debates in the Virginia ratification convention, James
Madison made the following clarification regarding who the parties to the
Constitution were: “Who are the parties to [the Federal Government under
the Constitution]? The people — but not the people as composing one great
body; but the people as composing thirteen sovereignties. . . . [N]o state is
bound by it . . . without its own consent.”178 Madison was unequivocal: “the
people” who formed the Constitution were not one undifferentiated people
group, not a single national entity, but rather an aggregate of numerous
sovereign people groups. According to Madison, the people of the United
States were acting not as “one great body,” but as many separate bodies,
each of whom was sovereign in its own right.
In The Federalist No. 39, Madison asserted that “the Constitution is to be
founded on the assent and ratification of the people of America.”179 Whom
did Madison view as “the people of America” in this regard? “[T]his assent
and ratification is to be given by the people, not as individuals composing
one entire nation, but as composing the distinct and independent States to

176. See supra notes 140-42 (Massachusetts), 152 (New Hampshire), 157-59 (Virginia),
165-67 (North Carolina), 174-75 (Rhode Island) and accompanying text.
177. See supra notes 147-49 (South Carolina), 162 (New York) and accompanying text.
178. 3 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 83, at 94 (emphasis added).
179. THE FEDERALIST NO. 39, at 239 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
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which they respectively belong.”180 Thus, for Madison, “the people of
America” formed the constitutional Union not as one national people group,
but as separate people groups composing the several states. Madison
continued, “It is to be the assent and ratification of the several States,
derived from the supreme authority in each State—the authority of the
people themselves.”181 Since Madison did not view the people of America
as one people group, but rather as numerous people groups, he could say
that the states ratified the Constitution. He could not have said that the
states ratified the Constitution if a single national people group actually
formed the Constitution.
Madison authored the Virginia Resolutions of 1798,182 in which the
General Assembly of Virginia declared “that it view[ed] the powers of the
federal government as resulting from the compact to which the states are
parties, as limited . . . .”183 Madison here again maintained that the states
themselves were parties to the Constitution. Given Madison’s insistence in
the Virginia ratification convention debates and in The Federalist No. 39
that the people ratified the Constitution, it is only reasonable here to take
his reference in the Virginia Resolutions to “the states” as meaning the
peoples of the several states, rather than the state governments.
2. Thomas Jefferson
The primary author of the Declaration of Independence, Thomas
Jefferson, evidently believed that the people of the United States were not
one national people group, but separate state people groups. Jefferson
drafted the Kentucky Resolutions of 1798 and 1799,184 the first of which
declared that “the several states . . . by compact . . . constituted a general
government for special purposes, [and] delegated to that government certain
definite powers, reserving, each state to itself, the residuary mass of right to
their own self-government . . . .”185 Regardless of whether one interprets
Jefferson’s reference to “the several states” here to mean the state
governments or the peoples of the individual states, Jefferson’s words
certainly cannot mean that one national people group formed the compact
establishing the new Federal Government.
The first resolution also asserted that “to this compact each state acceded
as a state, and is an integral party,” and that “as in all other cases of
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.

Id.; see also id. at 240.
Id. at 239 (emphasis added).
Contained in 4 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 83, at 528-29.
Id. at 528 (emphasis added).
Contained in 4 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 83, at 540-45.
Id. at 540.
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compact among parties having no common judge, each party has an equal
right to judge for itself, as well of infractions as of the mode and measure of
redress.”186 In other words, Jefferson was saying that the states are the
parties to the Constitution, and that each state is to judge for itself whether
the Federal Government has transgressed its constitutional bounds in a
given situation. For Jefferson, the right to determine the boundaries of the
Federal Government’s constitutional powers resides with the states
individually.187 Thus, any state may challenge the Federal Government’s
usurpation of unconstitutional power,188 regardless of what a majority of the
people of America as a whole think of the matter.
V. CONCLUSION
Political sovereignty in American government ultimately resides with the
people. But who are the people? The way in which one answers this
question is critical, for it determines who has the power to exercise the
rights reserved to “the people” under the Tenth Amendment. If the people
who formed the Constitution were one national people group, then any
rights reserved by the people to themselves may only be exercised as
prescribed by a majority of the American populace. However, if the people
who formed the Constitution were the several people groups of independent
states, then the rights reserved to the people may be defined, exercised, and
circumscribed in different ways, according to the different desires of the
peoples of different states.
The historical evidence examined in this Note demonstrates that the
people who formed the Constitution were the separate people groups of the
several states. Justice Thomas is correct. Justices Stevens and Kennedy
appear to be mistaken. If the Supreme Court does not explicitly recognize
that the peoples of the several states formed the Constitution, the ability of
American citizens to exercise their rights in the manner they desire will be
severely burdened. The peoples of different states will not be free to
exercise their rights in different ways according to their different desires,
but all people throughout the United States will have to bow to the will of a
bare majority of American citizens. This is not the freely diverse country
the Founders envisioned. It is a consolidated and restrictively conformist
nation. The issue of who formed the Constitution is not an arcane, pedantic,
186. Id. (emphasis omitted).
187. Id.
188. This is exactly what Kentucky and Virginia did with their resolutions in 1798 and
1799. These states were protesting the Alien and Sedition Acts. See 4 ELLIOT’S DEBATES,
supra note 83, at 528, 545.

210

LIBERTY UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 4:173

meaningless debate. On this issue rests the very nature of American society
itself—whether it will be diverse from state to state or uniform throughout
the country.
When this issue reappears before the Supreme Court, what will the Court
do? Will it continue to embrace the line of reasoning that logically requires
America to be a conformist society, or will it embrace the Founders’ vision
of a diverse American society?
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